We formulate a certain subtheory of Ishimoto's [1] quantifier-free fragment of Leśniewski's ontology, and show that Ishimoto's theory can be reconstructed in it. Using an epimorphism theorem we prove that our theory is complete with respect to a suitable set-theoretic interpretation. Furthermore, we introduce the name constant 1 (which corresponds to the universal name 'object') and we prove its adequacy with respect to the set-theoretic interpretation (again using an epimorphism theorem). Ishimoto's theory enriched by the constant 1 is also reconstructed in our formalism with into which 1 has been introduced. Finally we examine for both our theories their quantifier extensions and their connections with Leśniewski's classical quantified ontology.
Introduction
The first part of this paper (sections [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] is an introduction to first-order and quantifier-free theories with Leśniewski's copula 'is' ('ε'). Some of these theories also have the name constant 1 (which corresponds to the universal name 'object'). We present various connections between these theories and their semantic investigation in the following standard settheoretic interpretation of 'is' and 'object' (in an arbitrary family F of sets):
Open first-order theories vs pure calculi of names
Let L be a first-order language. A formula of L is said to be open iff it does not contain any quantifiers (i.e., if it does not contain any bound individual variables). Let Notice that all open theses of any first-order theory we can treated as universal. Thus, any open thesis ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is equivalent to the closed thesis ∀x 1 . . . ∀x n ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ).
By a quantifier-free theory we understand any theory which for some first-order language L satisfies the following three conditions:
it is built from the set F
o of open formulas of L, 2. the set of its theses includes the set of formulas from F o which are instances of classical tautologies, 3. the set of its theses is closed under modus ponens and the rule of substitution for free individual variables.
Remark 1.1. Quantifier-free theories understood in the above way can be treated as pure (i.e., quantifier-free) calculi of names, in which individual variables are schematic letters for general names and specific symbols are appropriate logical constants. Of course, when we examine pure calculi of names, we can replace individual variables 'x', 'y', 'z', etc., with appropriate schematic name letters, e.g.: 'S', 'P', 'M', etc. (cf. [3, pp. 11-22] and [4, pp. 5-6] ). 2 Remark 1.2. Models for pure calculi of names are ordered pairs of the form U, d , where U is any set (a universe) and d is a function of denotation from Var into 2 U , i.e., for any variable x we assign a subset of U which is treated as a reference of x (cf. [3, pp. 25-27] and [4, pp. 6-7] ).
2 In both cases where T is a first-order theory or T is a quantifier-free theory, the set of all theses of T will be denoted by Th(T ).
Let T be a first-order theory built in a set of formulas F . By a quantifier-free fragment of T we understand a quantifier-free theory whose theses are all these and only those open formulas of F o which are theses of T . Formally, a quantifier-free theory N is a propositional quantifier-free fragment of a first-order theory T iff Th(N ) = F o ∩ Th(T ). Obviously, T may not have a quantifier-free fragment, but if it has a such fragment, it is only one.
A first-order theory T is said to be open iff all specific axioms of T are open formulas. In this case, let T o be a quantifier-free theory built in F o and having the same specific axioms as T . It is known that (cf., e.g., [6, p. 329 
Two elementary Leśniewskian ontologies
Leśniewski's original ontology investigated the copula 'is' represented by the sign 'ε'. This theory is creative in the following sense: it has a creative language and creative definitions (see, e.g., [7, 8, 5] ). The only axiom of Leśniewski's ontology is the following formula:
x ε y ↔ ∃z z ε x ∧ ∀z, u(z ε x ∧ u ε x → z ε u) ∧ ∀z(z ε x → z ε y) (λ)
To avoid creativity in ontology, it is studied as a first-order theory (see, e.g., [2, 7, 5] ).
The theory Λ
Let L ε be a first-order language (without equality) with exactly one specific constant -the binary predicate 'ε'. Moreover, let For ε be the set of all formulas of L ε and For o ε be the set of all open formulas from For ε . In [10, 5] , the first-order theory in the set For ε based only on axiom (λ) is examined. We denote this theory by 'Λ'. Directly from the axiom we obtain:
Fact 2.1. The following formulas are theses of Λ:
It is easy to see that directly from (←$) we obtain (←λ). Thus, Fact 2.3. The sets {(ε 1 ), (ε 2 ), (ε 3 ), (←$)} and {(ε 1 ), (ε 2 ), (ε 4 ), (←$)} create other axiomatizations of Λ. So we have:
The theory EO
In [2] Iwanuś examined the first-order theory which he called the elementary ontology and which he denoted by 'EO'. The theory is based on (λ) and the following two axioms:
Jwanuś proved that these three axioms are enough to obtain a whole elementary ontology, i.e., for any formula ϕ in which the variable 'y' is not free we obtain the following thesis (see [2, Theorem 1.1a]):
Moreover, for any variable x which is different from the variable 'y' and any formula ϕ in which 'y' is not free we obtain the following thesis (see, e.g., [5] ):
So in EO we can introduce the definitions of name-forming functors and name constants constructed in the way Leśniewski wanted:
where 'z', 'x 1 ', . . . , 'x n ' may be the only free variables in ϕ f and 'z' may be the only free variable in ϕ n (cf. [2, 5] ). Formulas ϕ f and ϕ n may be instances of classical tautologies. Then we can omit them and from (df n ) in the language L ε1 with the constants 'ε' and the name constant '1' we obtain the following definition of '1':
Thus, in the theory EO we can define the constant '1', which in Leśniewski's theory represents the universal general name 'object'.
It is known that Λ is a proper subtheory of EO, i.e.,
Th(Λ) Th(EO).
For example, the following thesis of EO:
is not a thesis of Λ. So (df 1) cannot be a definition in Λ.
Theories EO and Λ have, however, the same open theses (see Theorem 4.4), i.e., For
Set-theoretic interpretations
In this paper we will only consider first-order languages that have one or both of the binary predicates 'ε' and 'ε * ' and a possible name constant '1'. For any first-order language L, any interpretation of L (for short: L-structure) is an relational structure with a universe U A in which a binary predicate π is interpreted as a binary relation π A in U A and, optionally, the constant 1' is interpreted as a member of U A . For any L-structure A, let Ver(A) be the set of all formulas of L which are true in A.
A L-structure A is epimorphic to a L-structure B iff there is a mapping f from U A onto U B such that for any predicate π of L and arbitrary a, b ∈ U A we have: a, b ∈ π A iff f (a), f (b) ∈ π B ; and, optionally,
Special L-structures are set-theoretic L-structures in which U A is any non-empty family F of sets and for any binary predicate π, the relation π A is determined in F by a set-theoretic formula Φ π (X, Y ). This relation will be denoted by π π π F .
For 'ε' the formula Φ ε (X, Y ) has the following form:
That is, we put:
Optionally, if L has the constant '1', then for any non-empty family F of sets we put 1 1 1 F := F.
We say that a non-empty family F of sets is an s-family iff {p} ∈ F, for any p ∈ F. We say that a field F of sets is an s-field iff it is a sfamily. A special L-structure with a universe F is s-special (resp. p-special; sf-special) iff F is an s-family (resp. a power set; an s-field).
Epimorphism theorems for Λ and EO
In [10] the following theorem is proved:
Thus, we obtain:
Proof: "⇒" Obvious. "⇐" Let ϕ be true in any s-special L ε -structure and let A be an arbitrary model of Λ. In virtue of Theorem 2.4, A is epimorphic to a s-special L ε -structure B; so we have Ver(A) = Ver(B). But ϕ ∈ Ver(B), by the assumption. Hence ϕ ∈ Ver(A). So ϕ is true in all models of Λ. Thus, ϕ ∈ Th(Λ), by Gödel's completeness theorem.
2
In [2, Theorem 3.II] it is proved that:
Although Theorem 2.6 holds, not every model of EO is epimorphic to a p-special L ε -structure. But in [5] the following theorem is proved: Theorem 2.7 ( [5] ). An L ε -structure is a model of EO iff it is epimorphic to an sf-special L ε -structure.
Thus, we obtain (as Theorem 2.5):
Because every sf-special L ε -structure with set-theoretic operations ∪, ∩ and − is an atomic Boolean algebra, Theorem 2.8 is a semantical proof the fact that the theory EO is definitionally equivalent to the first-order theory of atomic Boolean algebras (see [5, Section 9] We wrote that we can define in the theory EO the name constant '1' by (df 1). Obviously, we must extend the language L ε to L ε1 and add to EO the definition (df 1). Let us denote by EO+(df 1) this conservative extension of EO in the set For ε1 of formulas. Since (df 1) is true in all special structures, from Theorem 2.6 we obtain:
The theory Λ1
As we mentioned on page 238, the formula (df 1) cannot be a definition in Λ. So if we want to consider the constant '1' in Λ, we must introduce it with a specific axiom. This axiom can be the following formula:
Let Λ1 be the first-order theory in For ε1 having formulas (λ) and (ε1 1 ) as specific axioms. Fact 3.2. Formula (df 1) and the following ones are theses of Λ1:
Proof: For (cε1 1 ): We use (ε1 1 ) and (ε 1 ). For (cε1 2 ): We use (ε 1 ). For (df 1): We use (ε1 1 ) and (cε1 2 ). For ($1): We use ($) and (df 1). For (ε1 2 ): By (λ) and (df 1), we obtain:
But, by (ε 1 ), we obtain:
Therefore we also obtain the following thesis of Λ1:
Hence, by ($), we obtain (ε1 2 ). 2
3.
3. An epimorphism theorem for Λ1
We defined the following relation on U A :
By (ε 2 ), ≡ is an equivalence relation and it is a congruence on A, i.e., if
Firstly, we prove that for all a,
Suppose that a ε A b. Then, by (ε 1 ), we have a ε A a; and so
Secondly, we prove that for all a, b ∈ U A :
Since A is a model of (λ), for the proof of a ε A b is suffices to show that:
The quantifier-free fragment of EO
Let us describe the quantifier-free fragment of elementary ontology EO in Ishimoto's version from [1] .
The open theory E
Following Ishimoto, we consider an open first-order theory built in L ε and having (ε 1 )-(ε 3 ) as specific axioms. We denote this theory by 'E'. Since from (ε 1 ) and (ε 3 ) we obtain (ε 4 ) and from (ε 4 ) we obtain (ε 3 ), the formulas (ε 1 ), (ε 2 ) and (ε 4 ) create an another axiomatization of the theory E. Notice that (→λ) and (→$) are theses of E, but (←λ) and (←$) are not.
E versus Λ and EO
By facts 2.1 and 2.2(4), we obtain:
However, by Fact 2.3, we obtain: Moreover, in connection with Remark 1.2 and (df ε ε ε F ), models for the pure calculus of names E o are ordered pairs of the form U, d , where U is any set, d : Var → 2 U and the logical constant 'ε' has the following interpretation:
An epimorphism theorem for E
In [10] and [5] we have, respectively, proofs of "(a) ⇔ (b)" and "(a) ⇔ (c)" parts of the following theorem: Theorem 4.2. For any L ε -structure the following conditions are equivalent: (a) it is a model of E, (b) it is epimorphic to a special L ε -structure, (c) it is epimorphic to a special L ε -structure whose universe is a family of non-empty sets. 4 Hence we obtain (as Theorem 2.5): Theorem 4.3. For any ϕ ∈ For ε the following conditions are equivalent: 
o is the quantifier-free fragment of E, Λ and EO.
Moreover, for any first-order theory
o is the quantifier-free fragment of T .
∪F and for all X, Y ∈ F we have:
5.
The theory E with the name constant '1'
The open theory E1
Since the formula (⋆⋆) is not a thesis of E, if we want to consider the constant 1 in E, we must introduce it with specific axioms. These axioms can be the open formulas (ε1 1 ) and (ε1 2 ). So let E1 be the open first-order theory in For ε1 having the formulas (ε 1 )-(ε 3 ), (ε1 1 ) and (ε1 2 ) as specific axioms. Fact 5.1. Axioms (ε1 1 ) and (ε1 2 ) are independent in E.
, is a model of E and (ε1 1 ) in which (ε1 2 ) is not true. Moreover, the L ε1 -structure A = U A , ε A , 1 A , where U A := {0, 1}, ε A := { 0, 0 } and 1 A := 1, is a model of E and (ε1 2 ) in which (ε1 1 ) is not true. 2
Fact 5.2. The formulas (cε1 2 ) and the "→" part of ($1) 
E1 versus Λ1
First, notice that: Fact 5.5. The "←" part of ($1), i.e. the following formula
as well as the formula (←$), are not theses of E1.
Proof: The L ε1 -structure A = U A , ε A , 1 A , where U A := {0, 1}, ε A := { 0, 0 , 0, 1 } and 1 A := 1, is a model of E1 in which (←$1) is not true,
Thus, by facts 3.2 and 5.5, we obtain: Fact 5.6. Λ1 is a proper extension of E1, i.e., we have:
Let E+(←$1) be the the first-order theory which is built in For ε1 and which is a non-conservative extension of E by one specific axiom (←$1). Moreover, from (→$) and (←$1) we obtain (ε1 1 ); from (cε1 2 ) and (←$1) we obtain (←$). Hence Th(E+(←$)+(ε1 1 )) ⊆ Th(E+(←$1)). 2
An epimorphism theorem for E1
Theorem 5.8. An L ε1 -structure is a model of E1 iff it is epimorphic to a special L ε1 -structure. Proof: "⇒" Let A = U A , ε A , 1 A be a model of E1. We consider two cases. The first case:
We put F := {f (a) : a ∈ U A } and we show that f is an epimorphism from
Moreover, we show that for all a, b ∈ U A : 
We put F := {f (a) : a ∈ U A } and we show that f is an epimorphism from A onto F, ε ε ε F , 1 1 1 F .
Firstly, we show that for all a, b ∈ U A :
Finally, we show that f (1 A ) = F =: 1 1 1 F . This is due to the fact
"⇐" Obvious. 
E1 o is the quantifier-free fragment of Λ1 and EO+(df 1)
From theorems 5.9 and 2.6 we obtain:
o is the quantifier-free fragment of the first-order theories E1, Λ1 and EO+(df 1).
F , ε ε ε 2 ∪F , 1 1 1 2 ∪F . By Theorem 2.6, ϕ is true in 2 F , ε ε ε 2 ∪F , 1 1 1 2 ∪F . Hence ϕ is also true in F, ε ε ε F , 1 1 1 F , since ϕ is open. Therefore ϕ ∈ Th(E1), by Theorem 5.9.
Finally, For
A reconstruction of E in one of its subtheories

The open theory E * in the language L ε
Let E * be the open first-order theory in the language L ε with two specific axioms (ε 2 ) and (ε 3 ). Fact 6.1. E * is a proper subtheory of E, i.e., Th(E * ) Th(E). Proof: First, Th(E * ) ⊆ Th(E). Second, we have Th(E) Th(E * ). To show it we take a structure N, < , where N is the set of natural numbers and the interpretation of predicate 'ε' is the relation <. The formulas (ε 2 ) and (ε 3 ) are true in N, < , but (ε 4 ) and (ε 1 ) are not true.
We will prove that in the theory E * we can reconstruct the theory E. Between E and E * we define the following transformation tr : For ε → For ε . The function tr fulfils the following conditions for all x, y ∈ Var and all ϕ, ψ ∈ For ε : tr(x ε y) = x ε y ∧ x ε x , tr(¬ ϕ) = ¬ tr(ϕ) , tr(ϕ • ψ) = tr(ϕ) • tr(ψ) , for • ∈ {∧, ∨, →, ↔}, tr(Qx ϕ) = Qx tr(ϕ) , for Q ∈ {∀, ∃}.
We obtain the following: Fact 6.2. For any ϕ ∈ For ε : ϕ ∈ Th(E) iff tr(ϕ) ∈ Th(E * ).
Proof: "⇒" tr(ε 1 ) gives:
So it is an instance of a classical tautology. tr(ε 2 ) gives:
So it belongs to Th(E * ), by (ε 2 ) and classical propositional logic. tr(ε 4 ) gives: x ε y ∧ x ε x ∧ y ε z ∧ y ε y → y ε x ∧ y ε y. So it belongs to Th(E * ), by (ε 3 ) and classical propositional logic.
"⇐" By (ε 1 ) and the rule of substitution for free individual variables, for all variables x and y, the equivalence x ε y ↔ tr(x ε y) is a thesis of E. Hence for any ϕ ∈ For ε : ϕ ∈ Th(E) iff tr(ϕ) ∈ Th(E). Thus, since E * is a subtheory of E, if tr(ϕ) ∈ Th(E * ), then ϕ ∈ Th(E). 2
The open theory E * in the language L ε *
For better readability, we will analyse theory E * in another language L ε * , where we change the predicate 'ε' to 'ε * '. So in place of axioms (ε 2 ) and (ε 3 ) we take their L ε * -counterparts:
Notice that directly from (ε * 1 ) we obtain the following thesis of E * :
Defining the predicate 'ε' by 'ε * '
We extend the language L ε * to the language L εε * by adding the predicate 'ε'. In L εε * let E * +(df ε) be a definitional extension of the theory E * by adding the following definition:
So we obtain: 
Epimorphism theorems for E
* and E * +(df ε)
For 'ε * ' the formula Φ ε * (X, Y ) (see p. 238) has the following form:
either ∅ = X Y or both X is a singleton and X = Y .
In any special L ε * -structure, the predicate 'ε' defined by (df ε) is interpreted by the relation ε ε ε F defined by (df ε ε ε F ). So (df ε) is true in any special L εε * -structure F, ε ε ε F , ε ε ε ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ F . Proof: Suppose that F is a non-empty family of sets and R ⊆ F 2 is an interpretation of the predicate 'ε' defined by (df ε). We show that R = ε ε ε F . For all X, Y ∈ F we obtain: X R Y iff X ε ε ε ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ F Y and X ε ε ε ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ F X iff both either ∅ = X Y or there is a p ∈ F such that X = {p} = Y , and there is a q ∈ F such that X = {q} iff either both ∅ = X Y and there is a q ∈ F such that X = {q}, or both there is a p ∈ F such that X = {p} = Y and there is a q ∈ F such that X = {q} iff either there is a p ∈ F such that X = {p} Y or there is a p ∈ F such that
Remark 6.2. In connection with remarks 1.2, 4.1 and 6.1, models for the pure calculi of names E * o and (E * +(df ε)) o are ordered pairs of the form U, d , where U is any set and d : Var → 2 U . The logical constant 'ε * ' has the following interpretation:
The logical constant 'ε' is interpreted as in Remark 4.1. 2 Theorem 6.5. For any L ε * -structure (resp. L εε * -structure) the following conditions are equivalent:
universe is a family of non-empty sets.
F be an arbitrary special L εε * -structure. Then, by Fact 6.4, (df ε) is true in F, ε ε ε F , ε ε ε 
Z and there is a p ∈ F such that X = {p} = Y ; so there is a p ∈ F such that X = {p} Z; (iii) there is a p ∈ F such that X = {a} = Y and there is a q ∈ F such that Y = {q} = Z; so there is a p ∈ F such that X = {p} = Z. By (ε * 1 ), ∼ is an equivalence relation and it is a congruence on A, i.e., if
We denote the equivalence class of a by [a] . Notice that, by (ε * 1 ), for any a ∈ U A we have:
: a ∈ U A } and we define the function f :
We put F := {f (a) : a ∈ U A }. We show that f is an epimorphism from A onto F, ε ε ε
Suppose that a ε * A b. We consider three possibilities. For the theory E * +(df ε). Let A = U A , ε A , ε * A be a model of E * + (df ε). As for E * we construct the family F and the epimorphism f . Then for all a, b ∈ U A we have: a ε A b iff a ε * A a and a ε *
Thus, we obtain (as Theorem 2.5): Theorem 6.6. For any ϕ ∈ For ε * (resp. ϕ ∈ For εε * ) the following conditions are equivalent:
verse is a family of non-empty sets. 
A reconstruction of E in E *
It is easy to see that (ε 1 )-(ε 4 ) are theses of E * +(df ε). Thus, we obtain that E * +(df ε) is a proper extension of E, i.e.,
Th(E) Th(E * +(df ε)).
However, in the light of theorems 4.3 and 6.6, the theories E and E * +(df ε) have the same theses from the language L ε , i.e., we obtain:
Reconstructions of Λ and EO in some extensions of E *
If we use the language L εε * then we can extend theories in L ε * using formulas from L ε . Let us recall that the formula (←$) is not a thesis of E. So, by (6.2), it is not a thesis of E * +(df ε).
In virtue of (4.2) and (6.1), we obtain that E * +(df ε) is a proper extension of Λ. Moreover, in virtue of (4.3) and (6.1), we obtain that
However, in the light of theorems 2.5 and 6.6, the theories Λ and E * + (df ε)+(←$) have the same theses from the language L ε , i.e., we obtain:
Th(Λ) = For ε ∩ Th(E * +(df ε)+(←$)). In fact, by theorems 2.5 and 6.6, all theses of E * +(df ε)+(←$) are true in all s-special L εε * -structures. So if ϕ belongs to For ε ∩ Th(E * +(df ε)+(←$)), then it is true in all s-special L ε -structures. Hence, by Theorem 2.5, ϕ is a thesis of Λ.
Moreover, in the light of theorems 2.6 (or 2.8) and 6.6, the theories EO and E * +(df ε)+(←$)+(⋆) have the same theses from the language L ε , i.e.:
In fact, by theorems 2.6 and 6.6, all theses of E * +(df ε)+(←$) are true in all p-special L εε * -structures. So if ϕ belongs to For ε ∩Th(E * +(df ε)+(←$)), then it is true in all p-special L ε -structures. Hence, by Theorem 2.6, ϕ is a thesis of EO.
The theory E
* with the name constant '1' 7.1. The theory E * 1
Let E * 1 be a non-conservative extension of the theory E * which is an open first-order theory built in For ε1 and has the following specific axioms:
Notice that (ε * 1 3 ) is logically equivalent to:
From (ε * 1 1 ) we obtain the L ε * 1 -counterpart of (ε1 1 ), i.e.,
But the implication 'x ε * 1 → x ε * x', and so the L ε * 1 -counterpart of (df 1), i.e., 'x ε * 1 ↔ x ε * x', are not theses of E * 1. In fact, the L ε * 1 -structure
is the L ε * 1 -counterpart of axiom (ε1 2 ) of E1. However, we show that the L ε1 -counterpart of (ε * 1 3 ) is not a thesis of E1. 
A , 1 A be a model of E * 1. We consider three cases.
The first case: there is no c such that c ε *
Thus, in this case f is an epimorphism from A onto F, ε ε ε F , 1 1 1 F . The third case: there is a c such that c ε * A 1 A and 1 A ε A 1 A . As in the "(a) ⇒ (c)" part of the proof of Theorem 6.5, we defined the congruence ∼. Moreover, we define the function f :
We must show that f (1 A ) = F =: 1 1 1 F . This is due to the fact that
A a or both c = a and a ε * A 1 A . In both cases c ε *
. Hence f (a) = ∅ and a = 1 A , by the assumption. We consider five possibilities.
( For the theory E * 1+(df ε). As for the theory E * +(df ε) in the proof of Theorem 6.5.
"⇐" By Theorem 6.5 and Fact 7.3. 2
Thus, we obtain (as Theorem 2.5): Theorem 7.6. For any ϕ ∈ For ε * 1 (resp. ϕ ∈ For εε * 1 ): ϕ is a thesis of E * 1 (resp. E * 1+(df ε)) iff ϕ is true in any special L ε * 1 -structure (resp. L εε * 1 -structure In L εε * 1 we can build definitional extensions of two theories E * +(ε * 1 1 )+ (ε * 1 2 ) and E * 1 by adding the definition (df ε). Notice that Fact 7.7. Th(E1)
Th(E * +(ε * 1 1 )+(ε * 1 2 )+(df ε)) Th(E * 1+(df ε)). So the theory E * 1+(df ε) is a proper extension of E1.
Proof: Firstly, (ε 1 )-(ε 3 ) are theses of E * +(df ε). Secondly, from (ε * 1 1 ) and (df ε) we obtain (ε1 1 ), and from (ε * 1 2 ) and (df ε) we obtain (ε1 2 ). Thirdly, by Fact 7.1, the formula (ε * 1 3 ) is not a thesis of E * +(ε * 1 1 )+(ε * 1 2 ). So it is not a thesis of E * +(ε * 1 1 )+(ε * 1 2 )+(df ε). 2
However, in the light of theorems 5.9 and 7.6, the theories E1 and E * 1+(df ε) have the same theses from the language L ε1 , i.e., we obtain:
For ε1 ∩ Th(E * 1+(df ε)) = Th(E1).
(7.1)
A reconstruction of Λ1 in some extension of E *
If we use the language L εε * 1 then we can extend theories in L ε * 1 using formulas from L ε1 . Let us remind that the formula (←$1) is not a thesis of E1. So, by (7.1), it is not a thesis of E * 1+(df ε). Moreover, notice that: Fact 7.8. All of (ε * 1 1 )-(ε * 1 3 ) do not belong to Th(E * +(df ε)+(←$1)). In virtue of (6.1) and Theorem 5.7, we obtain that E * +(df ε)+(←$1) is a proper extension of Λ1, i.e., Th(Λ1) Th(E * +(df ε)+(←$1)). However, in the light of theorems 3.4 and 7.6, the theories Λ1 and E * + (df ε)+(←$1) have the same theses from the language L ε1 , i.e., we obtain: Th(Λ1) = For ε1 ∩ Th(E * +(df ε)+(←$1)). In fact, by theorems 3.4 and 7.6, all theses of E * +(df ε)+(←$1) are true in all s-special L εε * 1 -structures. So if ϕ belongs to For ε1 ∩Th(E * +(df ε)+(←$)), then it is true in all s-special L ε1 -structures. Hence, by Theorem 3.4, ϕ is a thesis of Λ.
Defining the predicate 'ε
* ' by 'ε'
As the definition of 'ε * ' by 'ε' we adopt the following non-open formula:
x ε * y ↔ (x ε y ∧ y ε x) ∨ (∃u u ε x ∧ ∀u(u ε x → u ε y) ∧ ¬∀u(u ε y → u ε x)) (df ε * )
The definition (df ε * ) in the theory E
Let E+(df ε * ) be a definitional extension of E by adding (df ε * ). We prove: Fact 8.1. The theory E+(df ε * ) is a proper extension of E * . Proof: For (ε Fact 8.7. Th(E * +(df ε)) Th(Λ+(df ε * )) and Th(E * +(df ε)+(←$1)) Th(Λ1+(df ε * )) Proof: Suppose that ϕ is a thesis of E * +(df ε). Then, in virtue of Theorem 6.6, ϕ is true in all special L εε * -structures. So ϕ is true in all s-special L εε * -structures. Hence ϕ ∈ Th(Λ+(df ε * )), by Theorem 8.6.
10
Moreover, we use Fact 3.
2
Finally, we prove that: Fact 8.8. Th(E * +(df ε)+(df ε * )+(←$1)) = Th(Λ1+(df ε * )). Proof: Firstly, by (7.2), we have Th(Λ1+(df ε * )) ⊆ Th(E * +(df ε)+(←$1) +(df ε * )). Secondly, by Fact 8.7, we have Th(E * +(df ε)+(←$1)) ⊆ Th(Λ1 +(df ε * )). 2
